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Insider Trading, Nasdaq Quotes, and Market Maker Competition 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study provides evidence of a direct relationship between inside spreads and 
insider trading activity that is stronger when there are fewer market makers or 
more concentrated market maker market share.  No evidence is found of a 
relationship between quote size at the inside and insider trading.  The results are 
consistent with the Stoll (1978) hypothesis that inside quotes will be more 
responsive to informed trading risk under less competitive market making 
conditions.  However, the results do not indicate that quote size is more 
responsive than spread to informed trading risk as predicted by DuPont (2000). 
  
Insider trading is arguably one of the more potent proxies for informed trading risk.  
Nevertheless, while market microstructure theory predicts a positive relationship between bid-
ask spreads and informed trading risk, empirical evidence on the spread-insider trading 
relationship is mixed.  For example, Cornell and Sirri (1992), Kini and Mian (1995), Chakravarty 
and McConnell (1997), and Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) find no evidence of a positive 
relationship between spreads and insider ownership or trading activity, while Chiang and 
Venkatesh (1988) and Chung and Charoenwong (1998) do.   
   Part of the explanation for these puzzling results can be found in recent theoretical 
developments.  Kavajecz (1996) and Dupont (2000) develop models of market maker spread 
and depth setting under asymmetric information.  The ability of the market maker to alter bid or 
ask quote size rather than spread in response to increases in informed trading risk may weaken 
the spread-insider trading relationship.  Moreover, Dupont (2000) shows that equilibrium depth 
is proportionately more sensitive than spread to changes in levels of information asymmetry.  
Empirical evidence of a relationship between quote size and insider trading is provided by Fishe 
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and Robe (2001), who find no change in Nasdaq quoted (or effective) spreads on illegal insider 
buying days, but detect a 3-19 percent reduction in aggregate ask size.  
   Another possible explanation for these conflicting findings is that market characteristics affect 
the degree to which market makers respond to insider trading-based asymmetric information 
risk.  Although information asymmetry lies at the heart of informed trading risk models of the bid-
ask spread, it is left to empirical researchers to determine and investigate the sources of 
information asymmetry affecting spreads.  Many empirical studies focus on time variations in 
spreads surrounding information events expected to resolve information asymmetries.  Cross-
sectional studies can reveal market characteristics that affect the relationship between spreads 
and risk from information asymmetry-motivated trading.  
   The Stoll (1978) hypothesis says that a specialist system allows easier identification of 
informed traders than a multiple market maker system.  Moreover, according to Benston and 
Hagerman (1974), the number of market makers for a stock is likely to affect the degree of 
asymmetric information that market makers face since this risk can be shared via market maker 
inventory adjustments.  Thus, the magnitude or significance of the spread-insider trading 
relationship may be lessened under a multiple market maker system in which both awareness of 
the presence of insiders and risk from trading with insiders is reduced.  The fact that insiders 
often trade using multiple orders over multiple days indicates that informed trading risk is spread 
out over multiple market makers.   
  This study investigates whether reported insider trades affect bid-ask spreads more or less 
than inside bid or ask quote sizes.  This study also investigates whether market maker 
competition affects the relationship between inside quotes and insider trading.  Inside bid and 
ask quotes are used since informed trading risk is borne by market makers at the inside.   
   As expected, this study finds a stronger spread-insider trading relationship under less 
competitive market making conditions.  Contrary to theory, this study finds that market makers 
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alter inside spread rather than quote size in response to insider trading risk.  In any case, the 
economic impact of insider trading on spreads is shown to be small.  
   The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section I investigates the relationship between 
insider trading risk and Nasdaq quotes at the inside.  Section II discusses the results.  Section 
III concludes. 
 
Section I 
   This section documents the relationship between inside bid-ask spreads and inside bid and 
ask quote size and reported insider purchasing activity under the influence of market maker 
competition.  The main questions addressed are whether inside quotes have a stronger 
relationship with insider trading risk under conditions of lesser market maker competition and 
whether inside quote sizes have a stronger relationship with insider trading risk than do inside 
spreads.  This section also examines changes in the number of trades and price levels and 
variability on insider purchasing days as compared to non-insider purchasing days.   
 
A.  Data and Summary Statistics 
   The sample includes all companies with timely reported insider open market purchases only of 
shares of Nasdaq National Market ordinary common stocks.   Insider sales are excluded since 
these trades are just as likely to be motivated by the need for liquidity as because of superior 
inside information (see Lakonishok and Lee, 2001).1  Also, only a few insider sales during the 
time period of investigation fall below the 500 share/$10,000 Form 144 reporting requirement.  
Insiders selling restricted shares above these amounts must submit a Form 144 to the SEC, 
Nasdaq, and the broker with which the insider places the trade simultaneously with placing the 
trade.  Given the timing of the Form 144 reporting requirement as well as the lack of information 
                                                 
1 Preliminary results were insignificant when insider sales were included in the sample.  
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on which trades in the sample are in restricted shares, it is impossible to categorize the insider 
sales in the sample as publicly revealed or not.   
   Limiting the scope of investigation to timely reported insider trades allows for a high degree of 
confidence in the completeness of the data set used.  The exclusion of late-reported or 
unreported insider trades, which arguably may be more informative, will generate noise in the 
results.2  However, including late-reported trades would require daily updating of the data set as 
new information became available, and it would never be known if all of the late-reported trades 
had been reported yet.  Unreported trades are usually unobservable, and when information is 
available, the data is usually incomplete.  
   This study also excludes any companies with reported insider trades that are not entirely 
composed of open market purchases of non-derivative securities during the month of July 1998.  
The trades that form the basis for exclusion include all option transactions, bona fide gifts, 
acquisitions pursuant to reinvestment of dividends or interest, acquisitions or dispositions by will 
or laws of descent or distribution, small acquisitions under Rule 16a-6, deposits into or 
withdrawals from voting trusts, transfers pursuant to a qualified domestic relations order, 
dispositions pursuant to a tender of shares in a change of control transaction, and other 
unspecified acquisitions or dispositions not classified as open market.   
   There are two important reasons for the exclusions.  One reason is that many of these 
excluded transactions are more likely to be liquidity trades than informed trades, and this study 
wishes to investigate the spread-insider trading relationship under the assumption that insider 
trading is a proxy for informed trading.  A second reason for excluding companies with these 
other types of transactions is that the data is usually incomplete.  The exclusion of stocks with 
these transactions ignores the impact of derivative holdings and liquidity trading on the trading 
strategies of insiders and the informed risk assessments made by market makers. 
                                                 
2 The SEC requires insiders to report trades via Form 4 within 10 days after the month in which 
the trades take place. 
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    This study also excludes trades reported by persons who are large shareholders (holding at 
least 10 percent of the company’s stock), but not managers or directors.  This is because large 
shareholders (typically mutual funds) are not likely to possess inside information to the extent of 
directors or managers (for example, see Henriksson, 1984).    
   The year 1998 is chosen for the time period of investigation because it is the most recent year 
for which complete data exists as of the start of this investigation. The month of July is chosen 
because it is a month in which total trading volume and insider trading volume are 
approximately average for the year.  Only one time period is studied because the data collection 
process is time-consuming, requiring that data on insider trades be manually entered into an 
electronic file.  It should also be noted that 1998 follows the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) reforms made to Nasdaq in early 1997 to improve competitiveness among 
market makers.  Weston (2000) finds that the combined adverse selection/inventory cost 
component of Nasdaq spreads has increased since the SEC reforms. 
   Daily data on all market maker trades and quotes is obtained from NASTRAQ.  Monthly data 
on market maker market share is provided by Nasdaq.  Daily data on closing price, high and low 
trading price of the day, and number of shares outstanding comes from CRSP.  Daily data on 
insider trades comes from the monthly SEC Official Summary of Securities Transactions and 
Holdings.  All companies with insider trades consisting solely of open market purchases on 
actively-traded Nasdaq National Market ordinary common stocks that took place in July, 1998 
and that the SEC received Form 4s for by August 10, 1998 are included.3  The Form 4 filings 
include several details of each insider trade, including the number of shares bought, the price at 
which they are bought, and the insider’s name and role in the corporation. 
   Of the 3,286 companies reporting insider securities transactions and holdings, 287 report 
open market purchases and sales only of actively-traded Nasdaq NM ordinary commons stocks 
                                                 
3 This corresponds to all relevant trades listed in the SEC Official Summary of Securities 
Transactions and Holdings Volume 64, Numbers 6-7. 
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during July, 1998.4  Of these, 26 are eliminated because the trades are made solely by 
shareholders holding ten percent or more of the stock, 37 are eliminated because of missing or 
incorrect data (for example, Sunday transaction date), 80 are eliminated because they involve 
open market insider sales, and four are eliminated because the dollar volume of insider trading 
reported exceeds the dollar volume of total trading reported for that stock for that day.5  This 
leaves a final sample of 140 stocks experiencing only open market insider purchases.   
  Descriptive statistics for the full sample of 140 observations are presented in Table I.   The 
difference between the mean and median values of duration-weighted inside spreads and 
depth, closing prices, and number of trades suggests skewness from the larger firms in the 
sample.  This is confirmed by the difference in the mean and median values of market value of 
equity.  The diversity in the number of market makers, market maker market share 
concentration, and percentage of dollar trading volume accounted for by insiders increases the 
likelihood of successfully identifying empirical relationships suggested by a priori theory. 
 
B.  Insider Trading and Nasdaq Quotes 
Spread is modeled via multiple regression as follows (see Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara, 2002):  
LSPREAD = α0 + α1LPRICE + α2LNTRADES + α3LTSIZE + α4LPVAR + α5LMM + α6LCONC + 
α7LINSIDER + ε 
The model uses the natural logarithm of each variable.  SPREAD = {∑t DSPREAD}/t, where      
daily spread DSPREAD = ∑k (D/L) x {(inside ask – inside bid)/[(inside ask + inside bid)/2]}, 
where D = duration of inside quote k in seconds and L = number of seconds in the trading day; 
PRICE = {∑tclosing price}/t; NTRADES = {∑tnumber of trades}/t; TSIZE = {∑taverage trade 
size}/t; PVAR = {∑t DPVAR}/t, where DPVAR = (highest trade price of the day – lowest trade 
                                                 
4 Companies also reporting transactions in other months are included in the sample. 
5 It appears that in some cases insider trades occurring over several days are reported as 
occurring on one date on the Form 4 report. 
 6 
 
 
price of the day) / (highest trade price of the day + lowest trade price of the day)/2]; MM = {∑t 
number of market makers}/t); CONC = (1 – pi)/[(n − 1) × pi], where pi = ∑ i=1 - n Pi2 across all 
market makers, n = number of market makers, and Pi = percentage market share (see Klock 
and McCormick, 1999); and INSIDER = {∑t ΣT dollar volume of shares traded by insiders/t}/ {∑t 
dollar volume of shares traded}/t.  t = number of insider trading days during the 22 trading days 
of July, 1998, varies by firm between one and 16.  T = number of insider transactions, varies by 
firm between one and eight purchases and one and five sales.  Duration-weighted inside bid 
and ask quote sizes (LBIDSIZE and LASKSIZE) are modeled using the same independent 
variables.   
   LPRICE, LNTRADES, and LTSIZE control for spread or depth changes associated with 
changes in market maker inventory-holding and order-processing costs.  LSPREAD, LBIDSIZE, 
and LASKSIZE are expected to have a negative relationship with LPRICE since the closing 
price of the stock is a proxy for the market maker’s fixed ordering costs.  LSPREAD (LBIDSIZE 
and LASKSIZE) is expected to have a negative (positive) relationship with LNTRADES and 
LTSIZE since the market maker’s inventory holding period, and hence inventory-holding costs, 
decline with increases in trading.  LSPREAD (LBIDSIZE and LASKSIZE) is expected to have a 
positive (negative) relationship with PVAR since price volatility is a proxy for the price risk a 
market maker assumes in taking a position.  LSPREAD (LBIDSIZE and LASKSIZE) is expected 
to have a negative (positive) relationship with LMM since the number of market makers is a 
proxy for market maker competition.  LSPREAD (LBIDSIZE and LASKSIZE) is expected to have 
a positive (negative) relationship with LCONC since the Herfindahl index of market maker 
market share is a measure of the contestability of the market in spreads.  
   Contemporaneous data on insider trades is used since this study investigates the spread-
insider trading relationship before public release of information on the insider trades.  Insider 
trading will have an impact on spreads even if market makers cannot distinguish insider from 
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non-insider trades according to the Kyle (1985) model.  Moreover, Givoly and Palmon (1985) 
provide evidence that the majority of returns to insiders from trading results from information 
revealed through the trading itself rather than public disclosure of the insider trading. 
   Given the model of the spread-insider trading relationship, a one-tailed Student’s t-test is used 
to test the hypothesis that there is a positive (negative) relationship between LSPREAD 
(LBIDSIZE and LASKSIZE) and LINSIDER (α7 > 0).  H1 is tested for the full sample as well as 
subsamples divided by median number of market makers and median market maker market 
share concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index.  
   The results for the full sample and subsamples divided by median number of market makers 
and median market maker market share concentration are shown in Table II.  For the full 
sample, LSPREAD is directly related to LINSIDER at a one percent level of significance, while 
LBIDSIZE and LASKSIZE have insignificant relationships with LINSIDER.  For both subsamples 
divided by the median number of market makers, LSPREAD is directly related to LINSIDER at a 
five percent level of significance.  However, the coefficient on LINSIDER is 54 percent higher for 
the subsample in which the number of market makers is less than the median of 13.  For the 
subsample of stocks with market maker market share concentrations greater than or equal to 
the median of 2,404, LSPREAD has a direct relationship with LINSIDER that is significant at a 
one percent level.  For less concentrated market maker market share, LSPREAD has a direct 
relationship with LINSIDER that is significant at a 10 percent level.  For the more concentrated 
market maker market share subsample, the coefficient on LINSIDER is 74 percent higher than 
that for the less concentrated subsample. 
 
C.  Effects of Firm Size 
  To confirm that the results found in the previous section are not due to differences in firm size 
rather than differences in market maker competition (smaller firms, ceteris paribus, can be 
expected to have fewer market makers and more concentrated market maker market shares), 
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the model is also estimated for subsamples divided by median market value of equity, MVE = 
{∑t shares outstanding × closing price}/t.  Seyhun (1988) provides evidence that insiders at 
small firms are more likely than insiders at large firms to trade based on firm-specific 
information.  This result implies that informed trading risk should be larger for small firms than 
for large firms, and therefore, that spread should be negatively related to firm size. 
   Table III presents the results.  These results show that the earlier results reported on the 
impact of market maker competition on the spread-insider trading relationship are not spurious.  
Firms with smaller market values of equity have insignificant spread-insider trading 
relationships, while firms with larger market values of equity have a direct spread-insider trading 
relationship that is significant at a one percent level.  Note that MVE and MM have a correlation 
of 0.39 that is significant at a one percent level, while MVE and CONC have a correlation of − 
0.19 that is significant at a five percent level. 
 
D.  Effects of Insider Trading on Number of Trades and Price Level and Variability 
   Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chung and Charoenwong (1998) find that spreads narrow on 
insider trading days because of a larger concurrent increase in non-insider trading.  An 
explanation offered by Chung and Charoenwong (1998) is that insiders choose high liquidity 
trading periods in order to mask their informed trades.  However, the detailed daily transactions 
data used by Cornell and Sirri (1992) provides evidence that increased non-insider trading 
volume follows, rather than leads, insider trading activity.  The authors postulate that bid-ask 
spreads do not widen in response to insider trading because the increased market liquidity 
allows market makers to better match trades between insiders and noise traders rather than 
bear the risk of being on the wrong side of an informed trade.  This explanation is supported by 
the Cohen, Maier, Schwartz, and Whitcomb (1981) model of order strategies by traders, which 
shows that as trading volume increases, the number of limit orders increases, allowing market 
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makers to better match trades.  As a result, increased trading volume leads to a drop in both 
informed trading risk and inventory costs. 
  To investigate whether changes in inside spread can be related to changes in inventory costs 
and price risk on insider trading days relative to non-insider trading days, the following model is 
estimated: 
L∆SPREAD = α0 + α1L∆PRICE + α2L∆NTRADES + α3L∆PVAR + ε 
The model uses the natural logarithm of each variable.  ∆SPREAD = {∑ti DSPREAD}/ti − {∑tn 
DSPREAD}/tn, where ti denotes each trading day in July, 1998 when a reported insider open 
market purchase takes place and tn denotes each trading day in July, 1998 when no reported 
insider open market purchases take place.  Similarly, ∆PRICE = {∑ticlosing price}/ti − {∑tnclosing 
price}/tn; ∆NTRADES = {∑tinumber of trades}/ti −{∑tnnumber of trades}/tn; and  
∆PVAR = {∑ti PVAR}/ti − {∑tn PVAR}/tn. 
   The results are shown in Table IV.  The difference in spreads on insider trading days is 
inversely (directly) related to differences in the number of trades (price variability) on insider 
trading days at a one percent level of significance using a two-tailed Student’s t-test.  However, 
the effect of the increase in the number of trades is greater than the effect of the increase in 
price variability as demonstrated by the 25 percent larger coefficient on L∆NTRADES.  These 
results would appear to be consistent with the findings of Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chung 
and Charoenwong (1998).  However, a comparison of means tests shows that only price 
variability is significantly different on insider trading days from non-insider trading days during 
July, 1998.  Price variability is 23 percent higher on insider trading days at a five percent level of 
significance.     
 
II.  Discussion 
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   Here, the relationship between inside spreads and insider trading risk documented in the 
previous section is related to theories of quote response to sources of informed trading risk.  
This section also discusses the relationship between changes in spread and changes in price 
variability and number of trades on insider purchasing days noted in this and earlier studies. 
 
A.  Quote Response to Insider Trading Risk 
   Theoretical models of the bid-ask spread predict a direct relationship between bid-ask spreads 
and the degree of informed trading risk faced by market makers, but vary in the way informed 
trading risk is measured.  Glosten and Milgrom (1985) predict that the bid-ask spread will widen 
as the ratio of informed to uninformed traders increases, while Easley and O’Hara (1987) say 
that what matters is the fraction of trades that come from informed traders.  In Copeland and 
Galai (1983), the market maker bases his bid and ask quotes on his estimate of the probability 
of encountering an informed trader as measured, for example, by percentage insider ownership.  
This study’s results are consistent with the Easley and O’Hara (1987) model since the proxy 
used for informed trading risk from insiders is a measure of insider trading activity.   
   More recent theoretical developments by Kavacejz (1996) and DuPont (2000) account for 
possible changes in both bid-ask spreads and bid and ask quote size in response to informed 
trading risk.  Both models allow for the possibility that a market maker can either increase 
quoted spread or reduce quote size in response to increases in informed trading risk.  
Moreover, DuPont (2000) demonstrates that quote size should change proportionately more 
than quoted spread to a given change in informed trading risk.  This study does not provide 
evidence supporting the DuPont (2000) theory that market makers alter quote size 
proportionately more than spread in response to informed trading risk. 
   Stoll (1978) suggests that insiders may be able to mask their informed trades more easily in a 
multiple market maker system than a monopolistic system.  Fishe and Robe (2001) provide 
evidence that this is true for the relationship between inside ask quote size and informed trading 
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risk from insider purchases.  Specifically, the authors find greater reductions in quote size for 
NYSE stocks than Nasdaq stocks.  Their results suggest that the monopolistic market structure 
of the NYSE allows dealers to more readily detect informed trading.  The results presented in 
this paper further suggest when there are fewer market makers or more concentrated market 
maker market share, market makers can more readily detect informed trading.  
 
B.  Empirical Observations on the Effect of Insider Trading on the Determinants of Spread 
   The comparison of mean inside bid-ask spreads on insider trading days versus non-insider 
trading days shows that, contrary to the findings of Cornell and Sirri (1992) and Chung and 
Charoenwong (1998), inside bid-ask spreads are not significantly different on insider trading 
days.  Nevertheless, the results of the model of spread changes associated with changes in the 
number of trades and price level and variability on insider trading days provides some indication 
that insider trading affects spreads via changes in the costs of market making.  The model 
suggests that the increase in informed trading risk from insider trading activities is somewhat 
offset by the decrease in market making costs, leaving spreads unchanged.   
    
III.  Conclusion 
   The evidence presented in this paper indicates that Nasdaq market makers alter equilibrium 
inside bid-ask spreads in response to informed trading risk from reported insider purchases.   
The relationship is stronger when there is less market maker competition.  The evidence is 
consistent with theoretical developments showing that market maker competition decreases 
market maker awareness of informed trading activity.  There is no evidence that market makers 
alter inside quote depth in response to insider trading-based informed trading risk.  
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Table I 
 
Summary Statistics of Insider Trading and Components of Nasdaq Inside Spreads 
Medians, means, standard deviations, minimums, and maximums of duration-weighted inside spreads 
and inside bid and ask quote sizes; closing prices; number of trades; average trade size; price variability; 
number of market makers; Herfindahl index of market maker market shares; market value of equity, and 
percentage dollar trading volume by insiders.  All variables are the natural logarithm of averages of all 
insider purchasing days in July, 1998.  The statistics are reported for the full sample of 140 observations, 
which includes all Nasdaq National Market ordinary common shares with reported net open market 
purchases only by insiders during the month of July, 1998. 
 
Variable N Median    
 
Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
SPREAD 140 2.15% 2.87% 2.70% 0.33% 22.24% 
ASKSIZE 140 691 839 646 50 4617 
BIDSIZE 140 959 1068 532 100 3403 
PRICE 140 $11.69 $14.91 $12.47 $0.69 $56.84 
NTRADES 140 31 80 121 2 527 
TSIZE 140 1120 1281 769 171 4834 
PVAR 140 4.77% 6.19% 5.12% 0.39% 33.82% 
MM 140 13 14 7 2 49 
CONC 140 2404 2597 1248 463 7519 
MVE ($millions) 140 $105 $347 $827 $4 $7,271 
INSIDER        140 6.04% 14.58% 20.58% 0.03% 100.00% 
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Table II 
 
The Inside Quote-Insider Trading Risk Relationship Under Market Maker Competition 
Regressions of duration-weighted inside bid-ask spreads (LSPREAD) and inside bid and ask quote size 
(LBIDSIZE and LASKSIZE) for Nasdaq National Market ordinary common stocks on closing price 
(LPRICE), number of trades (LNTRADES), average trade size (LTSIZE), price variability (LPVAR), 
number of market makers (LMM), Herfindahl index of market maker market shares (LCONC), and 
percentage dollar trading volume by insiders (LINSIDER).  All variables are the natural logarithm of 
averages of all net insider purchasing days in July, 1998.  The table compares the regression coefficients 
for the full sample to those of subsamples divided by median number of market makers and median 
Herfindahl index of market maker market shares.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  Using a one-tailed t-
test, statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Sample 
 
Number of obs 
Full  
           
N = 140 
MM ≥  
Median 
N = 73 
MM <  
Median 
N = 67 
CONC ≥ 
Median 
N = 70 
CONC < 
Median 
N = 70 
Model Panel A: LSPREAD 
Adjusted R2 86.00% 84.80% 83.94% 85.75% 83.64% 
Intercept 1.925*** 
(4.86) 
2.174*** 
(3.73) 
1.565*** 
(2.53) 
2.680*** 
(4.63) 
1.314*** 
(2.18) 
LPRICE −0.180*** 
(4.56) 
−0.200*** 
(4.24) 
−0.173*** 
(2.69) 
−0.182*** 
(3.43) 
−0.183*** 
(3.13) 
LNTRADES −0.342*** 
(8.61) 
−0.294*** 
(6.34) 
−0.414*** 
(5.29) 
−0.294*** 
(4.34) 
−0.341*** 
(6.12) 
LTSIZE 0.016 
(0.35) 
0.023 
(0.38) 
0.058 
(0.78) 
−0.077 
(1.09) 
0.067 
(0.97) 
LPVAR 0.583*** 
(12.86) 
0.458*** 
(8.22) 
0.670*** 
(9.36) 
0.602*** 
(10.11) 
0.565*** 
(8.15) 
LMM −0.145** 
(1.78) 
−0.254** 
(1.90) 
−0.054 
(0.36) 
−0.163* 
(1.39) 
−0.159* 
(1.32) 
LCONC 0.011 
(0.21) 
0.006 
(0.10) 
0.043 
(0.51) 
0.190 
(1.28) 
−0.119 
(1.24) 
LINSIDER 0.053*** 
(3.19) 
0.039** 
(1.84) 
0.060** 
(2.26) 
0.066*** 
(2.97) 
0.038* 
(1.52) 
Model Panel B: LASKSIZE 
Adjusted R2 14.81% 14.81% 14.81% 14.81% 14.81% 
Intercept 6.812*** 
(8.59) 
6.812*** 
(8.59) 
6.812*** 
(8.59) 
6.812*** 
(8.59) 
6.812*** 
(8.59) 
LPRICE −0.320*** 
(4.03) 
−0.320*** 
(4.03) 
−0.320*** 
(4.03) 
−0.320*** 
(4.03) 
−0.320*** 
(4.03) 
LNTRADES 0.147** 
(1.85) 
0.147** 
(1.85) 
0.147** 
(1.85) 
0.147** 
(1.85) 
0.147** 
(1.85) 
LTSIZE 0.100 
(1.06) 
0.100 
(1.06) 
0.100 
(1.06) 
0.100 
(1.06) 
0.100 
(1.06) 
LPVAR −0.171** 
(1.88) 
−0.171** 
(1.88) 
−0.171** 
(1.88) 
−0.171** 
(1.88) 
−0.171** 
(1.88) 
LMM −0.234 
(1.42) 
−0.234 
(1.42) 
−0.234 
(1.42) 
−0.234 
(1.42) 
−0.234 
(1.42) 
LCONC −0.019 
(0.17) 
−0.019 
(0.17) 
−0.019 
(0.17) 
−0.019 
(0.17) 
−0.019 
(0.17) 
LINSIDER −0.021 
(0.64) 
−0.021 
(0.64) 
−0.021 
(0.64) 
−0.021 
(0.64) 
−0.021 
(0.64) 
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Table II (con’t.) 
 
The Inside Quote-Insider Trading Risk Relationship Under Market Maker Competition 
Regressions of duration-weighted inside bid-ask spreads (LSPREAD) and inside bid and ask quote size 
(LBIDSIZE and LASKSIZE) for Nasdaq National Market ordinary common stocks on closing price 
(LPRICE), number of trades (LNTRADES), average trade size (LTSIZE), price variability (LPVAR), 
number of market makers (LMM), Herfindahl index of market maker market shares (LCONC), and 
percentage dollar trading volume by insiders (LINSIDER).  All variables are the natural logarithm of 
averages of all net insider purchasing days in July, 1998.  The table compares the regression coefficients 
for the full sample to those of subsamples divided by median number of market makers and median 
Herfindahl index of market maker market shares.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  Using a one-tailed t-
test, statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Sample 
 
Number of obs 
Full  
           
N = 140 
MM ≥  
Median 
N = 73 
MM <  
Median 
N = 67 
CONC ≥ 
Median 
N = 70 
CONC < 
Median 
N = 70 
Model Panel C: LBIDSIZE 
Adjusted R2 19.44% 19.44% 19.44% 19.44% 19.44% 
Intercept 6.653*** 
(10.73) 
6.653*** 
(10.73) 
6.653*** 
(10.73) 
6.653*** 
(10.73) 
6.653*** 
(10.73) 
LPRICE −0.264*** 
(4.26) 
−0.264*** 
(4.26) 
−0.264*** 
(4.26) 
−0.264*** 
(4.26) 
−0.264*** 
(4.26) 
LNTRADES 0.110** 
(1.77) 
0.110** 
(1.77) 
0.110** 
(1.77) 
0.110** 
(1.77) 
0.110** 
(1.77) 
LTSIZE 0.149** 
(2.01) 
0.149** 
(2.01) 
0.149** 
(2.01) 
0.149** 
(2.01) 
0.149** 
(2.01) 
LPVAR −0.251*** 
(3.54) 
−0.251*** 
(3.54) 
−0.251*** 
(3.54) 
−0.251*** 
(3.54) 
−0.251*** 
(3.54) 
LMM −0.099 
(0.78) 
−0.099 
(0.78) 
−0.099 
(0.78) 
−0.099 
(0.78) 
−0.099 
(0.78) 
LCONC −0.016 
(0.19) 
−0.016 
(0.19) 
−0.016 
(0.19) 
−0.016 
(0.19) 
−0.016 
(0.19) 
LINSIDER <−0.000 
(0.01) 
<−0.000 
(0.01) 
<−0.000 
(0.01) 
<−0.000 
(0.01) 
<−0.000 
(0.01) 
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Table III 
 
The Inside Quote-Insider Trading Risk Relationship for Small and Large Firms 
Regressions of duration-weighted inside spreads (LSPREAD) and inside bid and ask size (LBIDSIZE and 
LASKSIZE) for Nasdaq National Market ordinary common stocks on closing price (LPRICE), number of 
trades (LNTRADES), average trade size (LTSIZE), price variability (LPVAR), number of market makers 
(LMM), Herfindahl index of market maker market shares (LCONC), and percentage dollar trading volume 
by insiders (LINSIDER).  All variables are the natural logarithm of averages of all insider purchasing days 
in July, 1998.  The table compares the regression coefficients for the full sample to those of subsamples 
divided by median market value of equity.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  Using a one-tailed t-test, 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Sample 
Number of obs 
Full            
N = 140 
MVE ≥ Median 
N = 70 
MVE < Median 
N = 70 
Model Panel A: LSPREAD 
Adjusted R2 86.00% 74.93% 80.48% 
Intercept 1.925*** 
(4.86) 
1.787*** 
(2.98) 
2.062*** 
(3.23) 
LPRICE −0.180*** 
(4.56) 
−0.213*** 
(3.11) 
−0.177*** 
(2.65) 
LNTRADES −0.342*** 
(8.61) 
−0.375*** 
(6.71) 
−0.316*** 
(5.23) 
LTSIZE 0.016 
(0.35) 
0.012 
(0.19) 
0.040 
(0.53) 
LPVAR 0.583*** 
(12.86) 
0.586*** 
(9.08) 
0.575*** 
(8.02) 
LMM −0.145** 
(1.78) 
−0.017 
(0.14) 
−0.294*** 
(2.55) 
LCONC 0.011 
(0.21) 
−0.046 
(0.54) 
0.082 
(1.05) 
LINSIDER 0.053*** 
(3.19) 
0.063*** 
(3.00) 
0.025 
(0.76) 
Model Panel B: LASKSIZE 
Adjusted R2 14.81% 13.60% 11.85% 
Intercept 6.812*** 
(8.59) 
6.199*** 
(5.17) 
7.557*** 
(6.10) 
LPRICE −0.320*** 
(4.03) 
−0.237** 
(1.73) 
−0.336*** 
(2.59) 
LNTRADES 0.147** 
(1.85) 
0.273*** 
(2.45) 
0.002 
(0.02) 
LTSIZE 0.100 
(1.06) 
0.217* 
(1.65) 
−0.115 
(0.78) 
LPVAR −0.171** 
(1.88) 
−0.294** 
(2.28) 
−0.082 
(0.59) 
LMM −0.234 
(1.42) 
−0.498 
(2.02) 
0.161 
(0.72) 
LCONC −0.019 
(0.17) 
0.045 
(0.27) 
−0.137 
(0.90) 
LINSIDER −0.021 
(0.64) 
−0.018 
(0.43) 
−0.031 
(0.48) 
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Table III (con’t.) 
 
The Inside Quote-Insider Trading Risk Relationship for Small and Large Firms 
Regressions of duration-weighted inside spreads (LSPREAD) and inside bid and ask size (LBIDSIZE and 
LASKSIZE) for Nasdaq National Market ordinary common stocks on closing price (LPRICE), number of 
trades (LNTRADES), average trade size (LTSIZE), price variability (LPVAR), number of market makers 
(LMM), Herfindahl index of market maker market shares (LCONC), and percentage dollar trading volume 
by insiders (LINSIDER).  All variables are the natural logarithm of averages of all insider purchasing days 
in July, 1998.  The table compares the regression coefficients for the full sample to those of subsamples 
divided by median market value of equity.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  Using a one-tailed t-test, 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Sample 
Number of obs 
Full            
N = 140 
MVE ≥ Median 
N = 70 
MVE < Median 
N = 70 
Model Panel C: LBIDSIZE 
Adjusted R2 19.44% 6.48% 24.31% 
Intercept 6.653*** 
(10.73) 
5.982*** 
(6.62) 
7.522*** 
(7.14) 
LPRICE −0.264*** 
(4.26) 
−0.153* 
(1.49) 
−0.379*** 
(3.44) 
LNTRADES 0.110** 
(1.77) 
0.063 
(0.75) 
0.189** 
(1.91) 
LTSIZE 0.149** 
(2.01) 
0.188** 
(1.89) 
0.075 
(0.60) 
LPVAR −0.251*** 
(3.54) 
−0.165** 
(1.70) 
−0.389*** 
(3.29) 
LMM −0.099 
(0.78) 
−0.030 
(0.16) 
−0.171 
(0.90) 
LCONC −0.016 
(0.19) 
0.035 
(0.28) 
−0.059 
(0.46) 
LINSIDER <−0.000 
(0.01) 
−0.010 
(0.34) 
0.015 
(0.28) 
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Table IV 
 
Differences in Closing Price, Average Number of Trades, and Price Variability Between Insider 
Trading and Non-Insider Purchasing Days 
 
Regressions of differences in duration-weighted average inside spreads (L∆SPREAD) and inside bid and 
ask size (L∆BIDSIZE and L∆ASKSIZE) on differences in average closing price (L∆PRICE), number of 
trades (L∆NTRADES), and price variability (L∆PVAR) on reported insider purchasing days as compared 
to days of no reported insider purchases.  t-statistics are in parentheses.  Using a two-tailed t-test, 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels is denoted by ***, **, and *, respectively. 
 
Model 
Number of obs 
L∆SPREAD           
N = 139 
L∆ASKSIZE 
N = 139 
L∆BIDSIZE 
N = 139 
Adjusted R2 8.83% 4.66% 1.09% 
Intercept −0.484** 
(2.24) 
5.353*** 
(27.59) 
4.920*** 
(21.79) 
L∆PRICE −0.037 
(0.59) 
−0.142*** 
(2.51) 
−0.131** 
(1.99) 
L∆NTRADES −0.232*** 
(3.33) 
−0.074 
(1.18) 
0.013 
(0.19) 
L∆PVAR 0.186*** 
(2.69) 
0.024 
(0.39) 
−0.037 
(0.52) 
 
